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Interrogation Is Not Ethnography:
The Irrational Admission of Gang Cops as Experts
in the Field of Sociology
CHRISTOPHER MCGINNIs AND SARAH EISENHART*
Introduction
In California, in order to prove that a given crime is gang-related,
either for purposes of prosecution under the California Street
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act ("STEP Act") or to show
some other element of a crime such as motive, police officers are
regularly called by the prosecution and qualified by the courts as
gang experts. In this comment, we attack the evidentiary
foundations of police officer gang expert testimony introduced for
these purposes. The arguments are "common sense," and rely upon
valid applications of the scientific method and legal precedent. We
conclude that police officers do not meet the requirements of any
accepted standard of admissibility, even the low bar set by the
"opinion rule" currently in place in California.
The regular qualification of police officers as gang experts is
especially troubling in the way it primarily affects minority
populations. According to Malcolm W. Klein, eighty-five percent of
street gang members are African American, Hispanic, or Asian.,
The fact that minority groups are overwhelmingly subjected to
prosecution using the testimony of unqualified experts is a disturbing
and pressing problem.
* Christopher B. McGinnis, 2010 J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law. Sarah Eisenhart, 2010 J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law. We would like to thank Professor David Faigman and Abby Sullivan for their valuable
comments and perspectives on drafts of this essay.
1. Malcolm W. Klein, Introduction to THE MODERN GANG READER at viii (Malcolm W.
Klein et al. eds., 1995).
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In Section I, we examine the language and legislative intent of
the STEP Act. In Section II, we discuss the evidentiary power of
police gang experts. In Section III, we address the problems
associated with qualifying police officers as gang experts and
allowing them to testify as such in court and argue that Kelly/Frye is
the appropriate standard for admission of novel sociological
testimony such as gang expert testimony. However, we further argue
that police officers lacking in qualifications that go beyond police
work should not be qualified as gang experts under any scheme of
admissibility. Finally, in Section IV, we present some potential
solutions to control the admission and mitigate the results of
testimony by police officers qualified as gang experts.
I. The Language and Legislative Intent of the STEP
Act
California courts experienced very limited use of gang expert
testimony until the early 1980s. 2 Even after People v. McDaniels,3 a
1980 case where the California Court of Appeal held that expert
testimony was permissible regarding the sociology, psychology, and
practices of street gangs in South Central Los Angeles, "gang-related
evidence, if permitted at all, was usually introduced to prove a
noncharacter trait (such as motive, identity, or knowledge) or to
impeach a witness through bias and motive to fabricate.",4 "Early
cases involving the admissibility of gang-related evidence reflected a
concern that, like traditional 'bad character' evidence, such evidence
would be improperly used to show a mere criminal disposition or
'guilt by association.'
5
Things changed when the STEP Act was enacted in 1988.6 The
Legislature found that California was in a state of crisis due to the
activities of nearly 600 criminal street gangs.7 According to the
2. Andy Gutierrez, Gang Expert Testimony in Volume Two, in SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL CASES 748, 748 (Robin D. Kojima et al. eds., 2008).
3. People v. McDaniels, 166 Cal. Rptr. 12, 16 (Ct. App. 1980).
4. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 748-49.
5. Id. at 749; See, e.g., People v. Cardenas, 647 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1982); In re Wing Y., 136
Cal. Rptr. 390 (Ct. App. 1977); People v. Perez, 170 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Ct. App. 1981).
6. California Street Terrorism and Enforcement Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-186.33
(West 2009).
7. Id. § 186.21
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Legislature, these activities presented "clear and present danger to
public order and safety" and were not constitutionally protected. 8
Moreover, the Legislature found the gang homicide rate to be rapidly
increasing: rising eighty percent from 1986 to 1987. 9  The
Legislature's intent in enacting the STEP Act was to "seek the
eradication of criminal activity by street gangs by focusing upon
patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the organized nature of
street gangs, which together, are the chief source of terror created by
street gangs" and to punish or deter the criminal activities of street
gangs "through forfeiture of the profits, proceeds, and
instrumentalities acquired, accumulated, or used by street gangs."' 
0
The STEP Act contains three penalty provisions: (1) a
substantive offense violation;" (2) a sentence enhancement; 12 and
(3) alternate penalty provisions. 13
A. The Substantive Offense Provision
California Penal Code section 186.22(a), the STEP Act's
substantive offense provision states:
Any person who actively participates in any criminal street
gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who
willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious
criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished
by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed
one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16
months, or two or three years.
14
The key elements of this offense that the prosecution has the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt are:




11. Id. § 186.22(a).
12. Id. § 186.22(b).
13. Id. § 186.22(d).
14. Id. § 186.22(a).
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(2) that the group the defendant actively participated in is a
criminal street gang,
(3) that the defendant knows that the group's members
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal
gang activity, and
(4) that the defendant willfully promotes, furthers, or
assists in felonious criminal conduct by members of
that gang.15
B. The Sentence Enhancement Provision
California Penal Code section 186.22(b), the sentence
enhancement provision, is arguably the most widely used provision
of the STEP Act and it is the provision of the act with the greatest
number of cases using gang expert testimony.' 6 A defendant who is
found guilty of the sentence enhancement can face additional terms
with lengths spanning from 180 days to life in prison, depending on
the nature and circumstances of the underlying offense.' 7 The
sentence enhancement provides this additional punishment to "any
person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at
the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with
the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal
conduct by gang members."' 8  Thus, the key elements of the
sentence enhancement that the prosecution has the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt are:
1. That a felony was committed for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with a certain group
2. that the group is a criminal street gang, and
3. that the felony was committed with the specific intent
to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct
by gang members.' 
9
15. Id. § 186.22(a); Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 751.
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b); Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 751.
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b).
18. Id.
19. Id. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 751.
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C. The Alternate Penalty Provision
Finally, California Penal Code section 186.22(d) provides an
alternate penalty for defendants convicted of a public offense
punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor (generally referred to as a
"wobbler"). 20 Defendants convicted of a wobbler "committed for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal
street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in
any criminal conduct by gang members" shall be punished by
placement in county jail for a term of 180 days to one year or by
imprisonment in state prison for a term of one, two, or three years.21
The key elements of the alternate penalty provision which the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are the same as
the key elements for the sentence enhancement.
22
II. The Evidentiary Power of Police Officer Gang
Experts
Prosecutors often call gang experts to testify for two purposes:
(1) to give testimony involving statutory gang allegations under the
STEP Act, and (2) to give testimony involving some other material
issue which may be in dispute such as identity, motive, bias, or
knowledge.23 The police officer gang expert has considerable
evidentiary power. While testifying, the police officer gang expert
will often justify his or her opinion by making universalizing
assertions about the nature of gang culture that transcend the gang at
issue. Subsection A discusses police officer gang expert testimony
with regard to the elements of the STEP Act. Subsection B describes
other material issues on which the police officer gang expert testifies
related to the underlying charge. Subsection C reviews some of the
universal assertions about gang culture to which police officer gang
experts testify.
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(d).
21. Id.
22. Id.; Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 752.
23. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 753.
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A. Police Officer Gang Expert Testimony on the Elements of a
STEP Charge
While California Penal Code sections 186.22(a), (b), and (d) are
not identical, each of the provisions have certain required elements
in common. 24 Described most broadly, they each require proof of
the existence of a "criminal street gang" and proof that offense in
question was gang-related. 25 The "gang-related" requirement takes
two forms depending on whether the prosecution is attempting to
prove the substantive offense (section 186.22(a)) or attempting to
prove the sentence enhancement or alternate penalty (sections
186.22(b) & (C)). 26  For the substantive offense, gang expert
testimony is used to prove that there was a pattern of gang activity
by the members of the gang; that the defendant had knowledge of
that pattern; and that he or she willfully promotes, furthers, or assists
27in felonious conduct by members of the gang. Further, there must
be a showing that the defendant was an active participant.28 In order
to satisfy the gang-relatedness element for the enhancement and
alternate penalty, the prosecution must prove that an offense has
been committed for the benefit of at the direction of or in
association with a criminal street gang.29 In sum, gang experts will
often testify to one or more of four elements when testifying in a
case where the defendant is charged with an offense under the STEP
Act:
1. Existence of a criminal street gang;
2. commission of the crime for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with the gang;
3. commission of the crime to promote, further, or assist
the gang; or
4. active participation of the defendant in the gang.
30
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a)-(d); Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 754.
25. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 754.
26. Id.
27. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a)-(d).
28. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 754.
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b),(d); Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 754.
30. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 754 (citing People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 722 (Cal.
1996)).
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i. Existence of a Criminal Street Gang
Penal Code section 186.22(f) defines a "criminal street gang" as
any "ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more
persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary
activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts"
enumerated in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)-(25) or section
186.22(e)(3l)-(33) having a "common name or common identifying
sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity."
31
In order for a group to be classified as a criminal street gang, four
elements must be proved:
a. Primary activities of the group include commission of
enumerated criminal acts,
b. members of the group engage in a pattern of criminal
gang activity,
c. the group includes three or more people, organized
formally or informally, and,
d. the group has a common name or common
identifying sign or symbol.32
According to Andy Gutierrez in his article, Gang Expert
Testimony, "the two criteria that involve the greatest amount of
litigation are the 'primary activities' and 'pattern of criminal gang
activity' elements. These are the criteria most susceptible to
challenge because they break down into further legal components."
33
The primary activities criterion requires that the gang activities be
more than the occasional commission of enumerated crimes - the
commission of the enumerated crimes must be the one of the gang's
chief or principle occupations. 34 The pattern of criminal activities
element requires that members of the gang in question have either
individually or collectively engaged in a pattern of criminal gang
activity. 35  Under California Penal Code section 186.22(e), a
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(e)-(f).
32. In re Nathaniel C., 279 Cal. Rptr. 236 (Ct. App. 1991).
33. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 754-55.
34. People v. Perez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 827 (Ct. App. 2004).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(e).
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"'pattern of criminal gang activity' means the commission of,
attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of,
sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of two or more" of a list
of thirty-three offenses such as assault with a deadly weapon,
robbery, money laundering, and so forth. 36  These thirty-three
offenses are known as the "dirty thirty" by law enforcement. 37 In
People v. Gardeley, the California Supreme Court held that a
predicate crime constituting one of the two necessary to form a
"pattern" did not need to be gang-related as long as it was one of the
offenses enumerated in section 186.22(e) of the STEP Act.38 In
Gardeley, the court also held that the prosecution can rely on the
instant offense as one of the two required predicates, but must prove
that the charged offense was gang related.3 9
The prosecution will typically attempt to demonstrate that the
elements necessary to prove the existence of a criminal street gang
have been met by using gang expert testimony coupled with other
types of evidence. 40 To show that the primary activities criterion has
been met, courts have upheld the use of gang expert testimony alone
as long as the foundation for the expert's opinion includes specific
personal knowledge.4' In Gardeley, the gang expert's testimony
alone, based on "investigation of hundreds of gang-related offenses,
conversations with defendants and other Family Crip members, as
well as information from fellow officers, and various law
enforcement agencies," was deemed sufficient to prove that the
42
primary purpose of the Family Crip gang was to sell narcotics.
However, the foundational requirement of Gardeley is typically
observed only in qualifying the expert. The assertions the expert
actually makes on the stand may not reflect specific personal
knowledge of the gang at issue, but law enforcement's hypotheses
about the nature of gang culture in general. An example can be
36. Id.
37. DERRICK WATKINS & RICHARD ASHBY, GANG INVESTIGATIONS: A STREET COP'S
GUIDE 57 (Jones & Bartlett 2007).
38. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 726 n.12 (Cal. 1996); Patrick Mark Mahoney, Note,
Houses Built on Sand: Police Expert Testimony in California Gang Prosecutions; Did Gardeley
Go Too Far?, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385 (2004).
39. Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 726 n.12.; Mahoney, supra note 38, at 393.
40. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 755.
41. See, e.g., Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 721; In re Alexander L., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 226 (Ct. App.
2007).
42. Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 717.
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found in People v. Hernandez.43 There the gang expert testified that
"gang members commit crimes and that they are criminals, not law-
abiding citizens. 44 He continued, "gang members commit crimes to
'buy dope, and to purchase weapons to commit more crimes or
defend their territory."'
45
Gang expert testimony is also used to prove the existence of a
pattern of criminal activity commonly coupled with documentary
evidence such as a minute order or evidence of a gang member's
46prior conviction. The elements requiring a showing of an ongoing
organization, association or group and the existence of a common
name, identifying sign, or symbol are much more straightforward
than the "primary activities" element and do not always require the
testimony of an expert, although an expert's testimony is sufficient
to establish these elements.47 For example, in In re Nathaniel C., the
court held that a gang expert's testimony alone was sufficient to
prove a name common to members of a gang.48
ii. Commission of the Crime for the Benefit of at the Direction
of or in Association with the Gang
Typically, in order to show that a crime was committed for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street
gang for the purposes of the STEP gang enhancement provision, "a
prosecutor will rely on the facts of the current case, expert opinion
testimony regarding the nature of the particular gang in general, and
a fact-specific hypothetical posed to the expert on the
benefit/direction/association element." 49 For example, in Gardeley,
the gang expert testified based on a hypothetical that it is common
for gang members to intimidate people by assaulting them in the full
view of other residents of the gang's drug dealing area.50  In
Gardeley, the defendants were accused of robbery and assault of a
43. People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080 (Cal. 2004).
44. Id. at 1083.
45. Id.
46. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 756-57 (citing People v. Duran, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (Ct.
App. 2002); Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 725.
47. Id. at 760-61.
48. In re Nathaniel C., 279 Cal. Rptr. 236, 243 (Ct. App. 1991).
49. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 761.
50. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 717 (Cal. 1996).
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person who happened to be on Family Crip drug dealing turf.5 The
court in Gardeley held that this testimony could lead the jury to
conclude that the assault and robbery was committed for the benefit
of, at the direction of, or in association with the Family Crip gang.
52
iii. Commission of the Crime to Promote, Further, or Assist
the Gang
In order to prove that a crime was committed with the specific
intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang
members for the purpose of the STEP sentence enhancement, an
expert is often used to give an opinion based on hypothetical
question premised on the facts of the case as to whether or not the
crime was committed with specific intent to promote, further, or
assist the gang.
53
iv. Active Participation of the Defendant in the Gang
Active participation requires more than nominal or passive
involvement in a criminal street gang.54 The participation must be
current in order for the defendant to be convicted of the substantive
crime (§ 186.22(a)).55 However, it is not clear that the defendant
must actually be shown to be a member of the gang in order to
56qualify as an active participant. In terms of the sentence
enhancement and the alternate penalty (§§ 186.22(b), (c)), a
defendant can be convicted of the sentence enhancement even
though they are not a member of or active participant in the gang at
all.57
51. Id. at 716.
52. Id. at 722.
53. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 762.
54. People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000); People v. Englebrecht, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d
738 (Ct. App. 2001).
55. People v. Garcia, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 111 (Ct. App. 2007).
56. In re Lincoln J., 272 Cal. Rptr 852, 856 (Ct. App. 1990).
57. In re Ramon T., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816, 819 (Ct. App. 1997).
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B. Police Officer Gang Expert Testimony Supporting the
Underlying Charge
The utility of police officer gang expert testimony is not limited
to the elements of the gang enhancement or the substantive gang
charge. The gang expert's testimony can shore up a number of
elements that would otherwise be lacking in the underlying offense,
and can also be used to support a gang enhancement.
58
For most offenses, there is no requirement that the prosecution
prove motive. 59 However, the failure to prove a motive for a crime
60makes for a weak prosecution. The gang expert can give the jury a
motive for the underlying crime if that motive is otherwise
inexplicable: "what appears to be, at first blush, an amorphous act
with little in the way of rhyme or reason will take shape when the
gang expert explains the concept of respect in the gang culture."
61
Alan Jackson, in his article Prosecuting Gang Cases: What Local
Prosecutors Need to Know, gives an example of how a gang expert
can solve a motive problem:
[a] youngster rides up on a bicycle and fires a bullet into
the man's head, killing him. There is no connection
between the two. Jurors yearn for an explanation; the
gang expert provides one. The expert will explain that in
the most violent gangs, recruits must show loyalty to
their brethren by committing murder.
62
Jackson continues: "[w]hen the act is complete, the new member is
said to have earned the 'respect' of his fellow gang members."
63
Jackson points out the gang expert can shore up a case's "identity"
shortcomings. 64  Gang experts may testify that obscure graffitidisplaying the alleged moniker of the defendant and the defendant's
58. Alan Jackson, Prosecuting Gang Cases: What Local Prosecutors Need to Know, 42
PROSECUTOR, Apr.-June 2008, at 32.
59. Id. at 33.
60. Id.
61. Id. We will return to the importance of respect in the power of the gang expert's
testimony in the next section.
62. Id. at 33.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 34.
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alleged gang means that the defendant belongs to that gang.
6 5
Moreover, a gang expert may testify that graffiti is an admission of
the commission of a crime.66
If a defendant is being prosecuted under an aiding and abetting
theory, the government must prove that the defendant gave aid or
encouragement. 67 Jackson states that the gang expert can tell the
jury that the proximity of the defendant to the commission of the
crime is a basis for accomplice liability:
Merely throwing a hand sign or calling out a gang name from
the back seat of the car shows complicity in the crime. The
gang expert can testify that a drive-by shooting takes on a
special significance when accompanied by the signature of
the offending gang. That is, the reputation in the community
for violence is secured when witnesses hear, 'This is Farm
Town Crips' through the gunfire of a violent attack. Thus,
the back seat passenger who throws a sign or yells a gang
name may be prosecuted as an aider and abettor.
6 8
Jackson also suggests the gang expert can establish conspiracy
liability:
The players in the conspiracy may range from the O.G.
(original gangster) who supplied the weapons or ammunition,
to the graffiti tagger who warned the victim gang of the
impending violence. A close look at the facts of the case,
along with in-depth consultation with the expert, can, in some
instances, form the basis for a conspiracy charge.
69
Witnesses may refuse to testify to the prosecution's version of
events.7 ° Jackson notes:
one defining characteristic of a gang case is the recalcitrant,
uncooperative witness. It is hard enough to persuade 12
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Cal. Penal Code §31 (West 2009).
68. Jackson, supra note 58, at 34.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 35.
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strangers to agree on anything in a trial courtroom. The
difficulties mount exponentially when the prosecutor
introduces eyewitnesses who deny their previous statements
to police. These difficulties are even further compounded
when the recanting witnesses are law-abiding citizens who
appear to have no axe to grind.7'
The gang expert can be used to justify this behavior to the jury:
A gang expert can elaborate on the type of street intimidation
the defendant's gang employs. Photographs of graffiti in the
neighborhood, evidence of known gang hang-outs in that
territory, and specific incidents of gang retaliation against
witnesses in the past are a few of the seeds the prosecutor
should sow in the minds of the jurors.72
It is important to note that the expert's opinion on the presence of
witness intimidation can be founded upon hearsay sources.73 Such
sources are beyond the reach of defense cross-examination.
In rebutting the defense's alibi witness, a gang expert can
provide an explanation about why a person in the neighborhood
would so testify: "[i]n a gang case, those witnesses are often fellow
gang members who are called to provide an alibi for the
defendant., 74 Jackson continues: "when a gang member is accused
of a crime, the gang culture dictates that fellow members will come
forward to assist him, even if it means providing perjurious
testimony."75
C. Police Officer Gang Expert Testimony on Universal Gang
Culture
In many cases there are intangible cultural elements on which
police officer gang experts opine. The most common is the concept
of "respect." The similarity in testimony on this subject suggests
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 721 (Cal. 1996).
74. Jackson, supra note 58, at 36.
75. Id.
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that gang experts believe that all gang members share a common
understanding of "respect." This concept is present in American
culture at large, so a shared understanding of "respect" is not
surprising. Police officer gang expert testimony is novel in this
respect, though, because it advances a theory that varied gangs share
a cultural understanding of "respect" that is different than the
understanding of the population at large. This is often a factor that
courts use to justify admission of gang expert testimony - that gang
culture is "beyond the ken of normal jurors." 76 Yet, simultaneously,
this expertise relies on every gang member everywhere sharing the
same understanding of "respect." The cases below illustrate that
gang experts believe that gang cultures universally regard "respect"
as a social capital built by conducting illegal activities. The gang
expert, while differentiating the boundaries and colors of specific
gangs, tends not to differentiate the cultural meanings associated
with respect. The utility of such a simple explanation for illegal
activity in a prosecution should be immediately obvious: the gang
expert can opine that the defendant is in a gang, and for cultural
reasons beyond the understanding of normal jurors, compelled to
commit crime. The jury need not critically assess the motive, only
understand that the motive is beyond their understanding but within
the expertise of the gang expert.
In People v. Hernandez, the gang expert did not confine his
assessment of cultural norms to the particular gang at issue: "gang
members reveal the name of their gang during the commission of
crimes because they want the victims to know who committed the
offense in order to gain respect for the gang, to instill fear in the
community, and to increase their own level of respect within the
gang." 
77
The events at issue in People v. Garcia, occurred in Orange
78County. As in Hernandez, the gang expert opined that gang
members universally understand respect: "guns are used by gang
76. See, e.g., People v. Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (Ct. App. 1994). After the court
reviewed the detective/gang expert's testimony regarding "respect" in a particular instance, the
court concluded that this concept was beyond the understanding of an ordinary juror. The court
did not explain their conclusion that a normal juror would not understand the meaning of respect.
See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 800 (West 2008), which limits lay opinion to statements rationally
based on the perception of the witness.
77. People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1083-84 (Cal. 2004).
78. People v. Garcia, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 107 (Ct. App. 2007).
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members to intimidate members of their own gang and other
gangs.., and lead to respect within the gang." 79 The expert further
commented on the meaning of gun use to a gang member: "a gang
member who uses a gun intends to kill, not to wound., 80  He
continued, "respect is 'everything' to a gang member. Disrespect is
shown by mad-dogging, crossing out graffiti, or going into another
gang's claimed territory." 81 The gang expert also made the claim
"[g]angs gain respect by committing crimes."
82
According to the gang expert in People v. Ferraez, other illegal
activities enhance a gang's respect, and his analysis is not limited to
the gang at issue: "possessing drugs for sale enhances a gang's
reputation.
'"8 3
According to some sociologists, these universal assertions gang
experts make are questionable: "[b]y relying on other law
enforcement agencies' criteria for identifying gang members,
research indicating that individual gangs can be, and often are, quite
unique has been ignored., 8 4  Several criminal defendants have
offered Malcolm Klein, a sociologist who studies gangs, as an expert
in the area of gangs (his services have never been sought by a
prosecutor).8 5 Klein's testimony is often excluded on the grounds
that it is irrelevant because he does not have experience with the
gang at bar.86 In other words, many courts consider his testimony
irrelevant because it is too universal.
The case survey above indicates that while the basis of police
officer gang expertise might be "experience with a particular gang"
the actual testimony of police officer gang experts does no more than
reflect universalizing institutional hypotheses about "gang culture."
Conversely, Klein distinguishes between drug distribution gangs,





83. People v. Ferraez, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 640, 643 (Ct. App. 2003).
84. Placido G. Gomez, It Is Not So Simply Because an Expert Says It Is So: The Reliability
of Gang Expert Testimony Regarding Membership in Criminal Street Gangs: Pushing the Limits
of Texas Rule of Evidence 702, 34 St. Mary's L.J. 581, 609 (2003).




87. Id. at 516.
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other two types, are "inherently ambiguous" due to their loose
organization, and reflect a great deal of variety in their activity.
88
Klein argues that the police officer gang expert has a tendency to
characterize all gangs as though they were the Sharks and Jets of
West Side Story, and that this misconce tion leads to "major errors
in the handling of gang cases in court. ' '89 According to Klein, "[the
police officer gang expert] usually concentrates on crime patterns as
the quintessential defining attribute of gangs. He may know little
about gang structure, ethnic differences, [or] noncriminal
activities." 90
D. Concluding Comment
The discussion above shows that the police gang expert
testimony has incredible evidentiary power. Not only does the
police officer gang expert support the gang allegation, the gang
expert can provide juries with a motive for the crime underlying the
gang charge, divine the meaning of obscure graffiti to show identity
and an admission of crime, explain why a prosecution does not have
any credible witnesses to support their theory of the case, and
explain why a witness would say the defendant was not where the
police say he was. The gang expert's opinion enables a prosecutor to
cast a wide net to establish criminal liability for seemingly innocent
behaviors that are not obviously related to the alleged crime. Police
officer gang experts can do all this because they purport to
understand "gang culture."
91
Jackson does not mince words about an effective prosecution's
trial strategy: "[t]he easiest way to get gang evidence admitted in
trial is by filing a substantive gang crime or gang enhancement
allegation." 92 Once that charge or enhancement is filed, everything
the gang expert says becomes relevant to the gang charge.
93
88. Id.
89. Id. at 518.
90. Id. at 520.
91. Seeid. at 515.
92. Jackson, supra note 58, at 37.
93. See, e.g., People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 721 (Cal. 1996). Earlier in this section we
review how relevance arguments for gang expert testimony admission are overwhelmingly
prevalent, and in most cases eclipse courts' discussions of reliability. See supra Part II.C.
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III. Problems with Police Officer Gang Expert
Testimony
This section argues that police officers lacking qualifications that
go beyond police work should not be qualified as gang experts under
any admissibility regime. In California, scientific expert testimony
is evaluated using the Kelly-Frye test rather than the Daubert
standard. The Frye standard, used by federal courts before the
Daubert decision, was adopted in People v. Kelly in 1976, leading
the California test to be called the Kelly-Frye test.94 The Kelly-Frye
test serves as the foundational requirement for admission of new
scientific evidence. This test should apply to the foundations upon
which gang experts base their opinions, but California courts have
not yet adopted this position. 95 Expert opinion testimony in gang
cases is typically grounded on gang experts' own investigations,
conversations, observations, and training, rather than on any
scientific technique.
96
In California, the court ultimately determines whether the
evidentiary foundation for a gang expert's opinion is proper. Under
California Evidence Code section 802,
A witness testifying in the form of an opinion may state on
direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter
(including, in the case of an expert, his special knowledge,
skill, experience, training, and education) upon which it is
based, unless he is precluded by law from using such reasons
or matter as a basis for his opinion. The court in its
discretion may require that a witness before testifying in the
form of an opinion be first examined concerning the matter
upon which his opinion is based.
97
"The court may, and upon objection shall, exclude testimony in
the form of an opinion that is based in whole or in significant part on
matter that is not a proper basis for such an opinion. ' '98 In sum,
94. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
95. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 765.
96. Id.
97. CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (Deering 2009).
98. Id. § 803.
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while California does not require judges to examine the evidentiary
foundation for an expert's opinion for reliability and relevance
before the jury hears it, judges may do so at their own discretion.
Applying a Daubert-style analysis reveals that police officers do
not apply a reliable methodology. Looking at the purported
expertise under Kelly/Frye shows police officers do not give
opinions generally accepted in the field of sociology, which is the
field assigned to this particular expertise by the California Supreme
Court in Gardeley.99 Finally, looking to the admissibility regime
which currently operates to admit police officer gang expertise in
California, the "Opinion Rule," police officers lack the qualifications
in sociology necessary to render a valid opinion on the subject.
Subsection A reviews how California courts recognize gang
experts as experts in the field of sociology. To frame the issue of
admission of gang expert testimony in California, subsection B
reviews the methodologies of police officer gang experts. A close
look at the police officer gang expert methodology reveals how
"novel" and unreliable these opinions are in the field of sociology.
Subsection B also contrasts the police officer gang expert
methodologies to scientific approaches taken by true sociologists
who study gangs. With that foundation, subsection C turns to how
California courts should, but do not, review the novel sociological
opinions given by police officer gang experts: the Kelly/Frye
standard. Subsection D argues that even the permissive "Opinion
Rule" should bar police officer gang expert testimony.
A. Police Officer Gang Experts Testify as Social Scientists: A
History of the Precedent
California does not have a Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael
analog - there is no case that requires courts to apply the rigorous
gatekeeping standard of Kelly/Frye to technical experts.' 00 However,
it is inappropriate to classify the kind of testimony given by the gang
expert as "technical." The gang expert's testimony on culture and
99. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 721 (Cal. 1996).
100. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., the United States Supreme Court overruled Frye
as the gatekeeping rule for scientific experts in Federal Court, demanding that trial judges look to
several factors of reliability, only one of which is "general acceptance in the relevant field." 509
U.S. 579 (1993). In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court extended the
holding in Daubert to technical experts. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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social relationships purports to have the authority of sociology, a
field that tests hypotheses.' 0 '
Courts that wish to effect the legislative intent of the STEP Act
might find it attractive to place "sociology" in the realm of
"technical experience" - something that is not quite "science."
This kind of classification would lower the barriers for admission of
sociological testimony under Kelly/Frye; in California "technical"
testimony is not subject to a test of whether or not the proffered
opinion is generally accepted in the relevant field. Such a position is
contrary to the empirical methodology of sociology - i.e.,
application of the scientific method to problems of societal
relationships.
Sociology is recognized as a field in which the scientific method
operates. The National Science Foundation funds sociological
research and holds those projects it funds to high standards familiar
to other areas of scientific inquiry: "1) [t]he issues investigated must
be theoretically grounded; 2) [t]he research should be based on
empirical observation or be subject to empirical validation; 3) [t]he
research design must be appropriate to the questions asked; 4) [t]he
proposed research must advance our understanding of social
processes or social structures. ' 02 The UC Berkeley Department of
Sociology explicitly names the study of "urban gangs" one of the
focuses of the school. 1
03
Legally, this issue is closed; the California Supreme Court in
Gardeley has conceded that the relevant field of gang expert
testimony is "sociology."' 0 4 The precedent upon which the Gardeley
court relied to equate police officers to sociologists seems to have its
foundation in the testimony of a single officer. This officer stated he
made an attempt to study gangs, not utilizing any particular method,
but simply that he tried his best. No case asserted that such an
attempt would be successful.
101. An illustration on how gang experts opine on the meaning of both tangible and
intangible aspects of culture to the people who collectively experience them is discussed above.
See discussion supra Part III.
102. Nat'l Sci. Found., Sociology Proposal Criteria, http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/progdesc
/1998/sbe/1331.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
103. Trand Petersen, Letter from the Chair, http://sociology.berkeley.edu/index.php?
page=letter.
104. Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 721.
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Gardeley, the controlling law in California on the admission of
gang experts, relies upon People v. Olguin for the principle that
police officers are qualified to testify on gang sociology. 10 5 In
Olguin, the court cited People v. Gamez and People v. McDaniels as
precedent for the untenable position that "use of expert testimony in
the area of gang sociology and psychology is well established."'
' 16
However, there is a major problem with relying on precedent to
support the incredible proposition that police officers are qualified to
give sociological testimony. The cases the 0guin court cited, while
naming the police officer gang expert testimony "sociological,"
avoided any methodological discussion to support that claim.'0 7
Calling something science doesn't make it so.
In Gamez, the court centered its inquiry on the relevancy of the
testimony. 108  On the reliability question, the court resorted to
precedent: "case law has upheld expert police officer testimony in
the field of gang sociology and psychology."' 0 9  The Gamez court
cited In re Darrell T. for this proposition. 110 The only statement
remotely resembling "testimony in the field of gang sociology and
psychology" coming from In re Darrell T. is: "[a]ccording to Robert
Wilkins, a security agent at Gardena High School, there had been
anger and hostility since 1975 between the Payback Crips and the
Fives."" ' The words "sociology" and "psychology" do not appear
in this case; the In re Darrell T court did not self-consciously treat
the testimony as sociology.
112
105. Gardeley, the controlling case in police officer gang expert admission, in part relies
upon Olguin's suggestion that police officers have a history of testifying as sociologists. The
Gardeley court begins its analysis in the 3rd part of its opinion: "[w]e first consider the issue of
gang expert testimony, which in this case was given by Detective Patrick Boyd." The Gardeley
court continues: "California law permits a person with 'special knowledge, skill' . . . in a
particular field to qualify as an expert witness and to give testimony in the form of an opinion."
Finally, the Gardeley court cites the sociology language from Olguin: "[t]he subject matter of the
culture and habits of criminal street gangs, of particular relevance here, meets this criterion.
(People v. Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601-02 (Ct. App. 1994)) ["The use of expert testimony in
the area of gang sociology and psychology is well established."]." Id.
106. People v. Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601-02 (Ct. App. 1994).
107. See People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Ct. App. 1991); People v. McDaniels, 166
Cal. Rptr. 12 (Ct. App. 1980).
108. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 897-99.
109. Id. at 898.
110. Id.
111. In re Darrell T., 153 Cal. Rptr. 261, 262 (Ct. App. 1979).
112. See id.
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The other case the Olguin court relied upon for the equation of
police officers to sociologists was People v. McDaniels.1"3 The
McDaniels court rejected the defense's claim that the officer was
unqualified to give testimony "related to the sociology and
psychology of gangs" by saying, basically, that the officer tried his
best: "Deputy Giron stated 'as part of [his] duties [he had] made an
effort to study the social customs.., of gangs in South Central Los
Angeles.' We are unable to discern why defendant insists that the
foregoing so utterly fails to reflect sufficient familiarity with south
central Los Angeles gangs."1 14 It should seem obvious that "but the
officer tried" is little comfort to defendants bearing the burden to
counter law enforcement suspicion cloaked as reliable science in a
court dodging the issue of reliability.
A venerable history of police officers passing as sociologists
does not explain why police officers are reliably able to provide
testimony on sociological concepts. Further, the major rational for
adhering to poorly-reasoned precedents - putting citizens on notice
of the settled state of law - does not apply here, as the government
is the only party that would be affected by a change in the
admissibility of police officer gang expertise.
B. Police Officers Do Not Apply a Reliable Methodology to Test
Gang Membership
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the United States
Supreme Court announced a new gatekeeping standard federal courts
were to apply when confronted with scientific evidence. 115 The
Court instructed district court judges to look to five factors to
ascertain whether proffered scientific evidence would be allowed
into evidence: 1) "whether [a theory or technique] can be (and has
been) tested," 2) "whether the theory or technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication," 3) "the known or potential rate of
error," 4) "the existence and maintenance of standards controlling
the technique's operation," and 5) general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community.
116
113. People v. Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601-02 (Ct. App. 1994).
114. People v. McDaniels, 166 Cal. Rptr. 12, 16 (Ct. App. 1980).
115. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
116. Id. at 593-94.
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Though it is not controlling law in California, a look at police
officer gang expert testimony in the Daubert context illustrates an
important lesson: the methodology of police officer gang experts is
unreliable. California law utilizes Kelly/Frye's "general acceptance"
standard as a proxy to look into the reliability of a method, and
entrusts that task to experts in the relevant field, rather than that
burden on the court, as Daubert does. However, to determine the
degree of potential injustice that can arise from admission of police
officer gang expert testimony, it is worthwhile to look beyond the
binary "yes/no" answer to Kelly/Frye's general acceptance question.
A look at police officer gang expert methodology demonstrates why
that methodology is not accepted in the relevant field (enriching a
Kelly/Frye analysis), and why police officer gang experts are not
qualified sociologists (enriching an "opinion rule" analysis).
i. There Is No Test for Gang Membership
Police officers use loose standards and highly suspect sources to
test their hypotheses of "gang membership." The methodologies
police officer gang experts use boil down to the criteria produced by
the California Youth Gang Task Force to identify a gang member.
These criteria are as follows:
1. subject admits gang membership,
2. subject has tattoos, clothing, etc., that are only
associated with certain gangs,
3. subject has been arrested while participating in
activities with a known gang member,
4. information that places the subject with a gang has
been obtained from a reliable informant, and
5. close association with known gang members has been
confirmed.
117
This methodology is explored in subsections i-iii below. Factors
three and five are ignored as both factors must rely on the remaining
factors to determine "known gang members" because they presume
what they purport to test: gang membership.
117. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 715-16 (Cal. 1996).
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a. Self-Reporting of Gang Membership Is Unreliable
Evidence exists that many people are unable to reliably self-
report gang membership. One study of 1,527 "at risk" youth in
Denver identified the tendency of self-reported gang affiliation to be
an unreliable indicator of actual criminal street gang membership.'
1 8
In one study to ascertain normative differences between non-gang-
affiliated at-risk youth and gang-affiliated at-risk youth, researchers
asked if the subjects were "members of a street or youth gang."'
1 19
As a controlling measure to ensure accurate reporting, interviewers
did not simply rely upon the interviewee's self-reported claim of
gang membership, but instead delved into the nature of the youth's
self-reported "gang" association:
All of those responding affirmatively were later asked a
series of questions about their gangs. Examination of this
follow-up information indicated that what some of these
youth described as gangs could best be defined as informal
youth groups or, in some instances, church groups that did
not necessarily include involvement in delinquent behavior.
To be considered a gang member, the youth had to indicate
that the gang was involved in illegal activity ... this process
allows for a more stringent and, arguably, more accurate
description of juvenile delinquent gang membership and1 20
activity.
In light of this documented unreliability, self-reporting should be
tested by an expert relying on this information as the basis of his
opinion. Sociologists studying this problem test self-reporting, and
do not uncritically accept an admission of gang membership.
118. Finn-Aage Esbensen, David Huizinga & Anne W. Weiher, Gang and Non-Gang
Youth: Differences in Explanatory Factors, in THE MODERN GANG READER, supra note 85, at
192, 194 (Malcolm Klein ed., 1995).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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b. Aesthetics Are Unreliable Indicators of Gang
Membership
Visual indicia are not as easy to interpret as "common sense"
might suggest. "Indicia of gang membership" can be adopted for
safety reasons or for fashion. 12 1 They can also be an attempted
assertion of power, or a rejection of authority unconnected to a
criminal purpose. 122 They can also reflect an adoption of aesthetics
available in popular media. 123 Those demonstrating such behavior
might be "pee wees" or "wannabes," uninvolved in any criminal
activity:
Children as young as four or five at a ... preschool program
would arrive each day with their hats turned to the left,
showing allegiance to the Vice Lords, or to the right, for the
Disciples. A group [of pre-teenagers] like the Four Corners
imitated their older counterparts. But there was no real
organization or discipline; moreover, they didn't sell
drugs. 1
24
It might be argued that by viewing someone bearing
"indicia of gang membership" in the police officer's
experience, that officer may be able to develop a hypothesis
about group membership. That hypothesis is still several steps
removed from a gang expert's ultimate opinion: 1) that the
group has a criminal purpose such as to qualify it as a criminal
street gang, and 2) that the person displaying the indicia has
involvement with that gang that is more than nominal or
passive. However, upon viewing indicia, that hypothesis has
yet to be tested.
Not only does this criterion have a "false positive"
problem, it also has a potential for false negatives:
sophisticated gangs hide their membership and do not show
121. Id. at 961.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF TWO
BoYs GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA 221-22 (1991)).
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gang colors. 12 5  Gang experts cannot reliably identify gang
members based on appearance.
26
c. "Reliable Informants": Police Qfficer Hearsay
Sources
Often gang experts base their opinions on the statements of
former or current gang members. 12 7  These can be extremely
unreliable. 128  While a "reliable" informant's information is
considered sufficient for the purposes of determining whether
probable cause exists to issue a warrant for search or seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, the reliability concerns of expert testimony
are distinguishable from the Fourth Amendment context. 129 Experts
may use hearsay in forming a basis of their opinion, however, that
hearsay source must be "reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming an opinion."'130  Undisclosed reporters
with ambiguous motivations are highly suspect for the purposes of
expert testimony. The information upon which the gang expert
bases his opinion "originates with two 'highly suspect' groups of
reporters - gang members and those who process the data, such as
police officers and service providers.' 13 1  These sources are often
self-serving and unverifiable. 132  Suspected gang members
themselves are the primary sources for law enforcement information
on gangs, but these sources can both exaggerate facts during an
125. Gomez, supra note 84, at 620.
126. Id.
127. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 774.
128. Id.
129. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The United States Supreme Court applied a
totality of the circumstances test to find the informant in Gates reliable based on the tip including
information that independent police work verified. The standard to be met here was whether this
information gave rise to probable cause to believe evidence subject to seizure would be found in
the place searched, required for the issuance of a warrant. "Probable cause" is a standard of proof
lower than a preponderance standard.
130. While Gardeley doesn't create a preponderance standard, the language of the case
suggests that lower courts are not to rubber stamp any hearsay source an expert relies upon as
"reliable": "[1]ike a house built on sand, the expert's opinion is no better than the facts on which it
is based." People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 721 (Cal. 1996). This suggests a more rigorous
inquiry than that a magistrate undergoes when determining whether an informant gives rise to
probable cause to issue a warrant.
131. Gomez, supra note 84, at 605.
132. Id.
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interrogation and also lack knowledge of the scope of the gang's
activities.'
33
Dr. Lewis Yablonsky addresses the issue of why these statements
are unreliable - especially when made in reference to a specific
incident - in his book, Gangs in Court.134 Yablonsky cites four
reasons why a current gang member's testimony might lack value
and veracity in a criminal case.' 35 First is the nature of the arrest
situation. 136  Often when a gang member is caught in an arrest
situation, his or her first move will be towards self-preservation. 1
37
Yablonsky states that a gang member will often implicate fellow
gang members at the prospect of an early release or shorter
sentence.' 38 "The main constraint on turning in his best friend in an
arrest situation is whether or not the individual who he fingers or the
gang will retaliate with violence against him at a later date."'
' 39
The second reason to doubt the reliability of a current gang
member's testimony lies in the concept of the "outsider."' 140 In order
to avoid having to snitch on someone in his or her own gang, a gang
member will implicate an "outsider" especially if the outsider has
some possible connection to the offense in question. 141 By fingering
an outsider, a gang member can get the self-preserving benefits of a
shorter sentence and escape revenge from possible retaliation from
members of his own gang.
142
Third, the impact of the police during investigation also is a
factor to take into account when assessing the reliability of a gang
member's statements. 143  "The police motivation element of the
equation can force a suspect to shade the truth or outright lie to fit his
'testimony' into a story that will solve a crime and lead to a
conviction."' 144  Fourth, Yablonsky questions the ability of gang
133. Id. (citing Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 739, 773-74 n.164 (1993)).






139. Id. at 110-11.






members to be truthful. Studying gangs for over fifty years,
Yablonsky has concluded that many true gang members possess
sociopathic traits and are pathological liars.'45
ii. Police Officer Gang Experts Use Unreliable Convictions to
Establish the Existence of a Gang
All of the offenses in the STEP Act require the prosecution to
prove the existence of a criminal street gang. Experts use the
evidence of prior gang convictions as the basis for their opinion of
the existence of a gang. For example, if Defendant A was convicted
of robbery with a gang enhancement as a member of Gang X, then
when Defendant B comes to trial sometime later, the expert will rely
on the fact that Defendant A was convicted as a member of Gang X
as evidence of the existence of Gang X. This is troubling because, in
certain situations, a defendant will plead guilty to a gang charge
simply as part of a good plea bargain. In doing so, he or she will
essentially be asserting that a certain gang (the one associated with
the charge) does in fact exist. The "fact" of the gang's existence can
be used as evidence of existence of the gang in future
prosecutions. 146 This is problematic for two reasons: (1) because
that information may not be accurate, and (2) because the fact of the
existence of the gang was not determined by a jury.
The fact of a prior conviction, if presented in court for this
purpose, would be hearsay. The prior conviction is offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted - namely, that Gang X exists. This
raises serious constitutional issues. Three points that need to be
considered to assess the constitutionality of this practice are: (1)
whether prior convictions are testimonial; (2) whether there is an
appropriate hearsay exception which might render them admissible;
and (3) whether Apprendi's exception for prior convictions has any
relevance to this point.
145. Id. at 110.
146. The scenario presented here and the possibility of its occurrence was discussed at a
gang training seminar for Contra Costa County Public Defenders in July, 2008 particularly in
reference to prosecutions involving the Richmond Deep C gang.
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First, in People v. Taulton, the California Court of Appeal held
that prior convictions are not testimonial and therefore are not
subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
147
Second, on the point of whether there are any relevant hearsay
exceptions, while the Federal Rules of Evidence create a hearsay
exception for judgments of conviction under rule 803(22), the
exception only applies to the accused's prior convictions:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness: (22) Judgment
of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment,
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a
plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year,
to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not
including, when offered by the Government in a criminal
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments
against persons other than the accused. 1
48
In California, under California Evidence Code section 1300,
"Evidence of a final judgment adjudging a person guilty of a crime
punishable as a felony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule
when offered in a civil action to prove any fact essential to the
judgment whether or not the judgment was based on a plea of nolo
contendere."' 149 This exception applies only to the use of a final
judgment in a subsequent civil case - it does not establish an
exception for the use of a final judgment in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. 150
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that "any fact (other
than a prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty of a
crime must be... submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt."' 15 1 Here, as in Apprendi, which dealt with a hate
crime enhancement, the STEP enhancement would increase the
maximum penalty of a crime. Therefore, the elements of the STEP
147. People v. Taulton, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203 (Ct. App. 2005).
148. FED. R. EvID. 803(22) (emphasis added).
149. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1300 (West 2009).
150. Id.
151. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
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enhancement must be proven in front of a jury. However, Apprendi
recognizes an exception for prior convictions. The reasoning behind
this exception is two-fold: (1) prior convictions occurred in a jury
trial proceeding where the standard of proof was "beyond a
reasonable doubt," and (2) recidivism has traditionally been a basis
for increasing a sentence and does not relate to the circumstances of
the offense. 152  However, this reasoning does not apply to the
situation presented above - a plea bargain does not entail a jury or a
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Further, the conviction at issue
is not necessarily the conviction of the accused and therefore,
recidivism is irrelevant to these situations. In the unique situation
above, the policy behind Apprendi's prior conviction exception does
not apply. An argument can thus be made that Apprendi should be
followed, while its exception should be set aside, in this situation. If
this is the case, gang experts should not be allowed to base their
opinion that a gang exists solely on the fact that other people have
sustained a prior STEP conviction involving the same gang.
In sum, although no Confrontation Clause issue arises at the use
of prior convictions as a base for a gang expert's opinion and it is not
clear that Apprendi directly prohibits it on its face, there is no
recognized hearsay exception for this use of a prior conviction if
done openly in court. There is a possibility, as described above, that
this sort of evidence might be unreliable as factual proof of the
existence of a gang. This creates the possibility of a troubling
loophole in the evidentiary system.
iii. Methodologies Applied by Police Officer Gang Experts on
the Ground
a. Field Interview Cards
Field Interview cards ("F.I. cards") are prepared by police
officers. A field interview is a field contact with a civilian for
investigative purposes. The purpose of field interviews is often to
build reasonable suspicion or even probable cause to arrest or
conduct a search. Field interviews are also used as a source of
information, a way of identifying a suspect, or a means of obtaining
152. Id. at 488.
Winter 2010] INTERROGATION Is NOT ETHNOGRAPHY
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
suspects or witnesses.1 53 Because the purpose of F.I. cards is to help
police investigations and because they are gathered to provide
evidence to aid in criminal prosecutions, F.I. cards qualify as
testimonial evidence. Unless the officer who prepared the cards
upon which the gang expert is basing his or her opinion (i.e., the
declarant) is available for cross-examination, the expert should not
be allowed to take these cards into consideration when forming his
or her opinion.
Courts should be hesitant to allow use of these cards as a basis
for an expert's opinion. In his book Gangs in Court, gang expert Dr.
Lewis Yablonsky dramatically likens the use of F.I. cards to the
black lists of the 1950s. 154 Yablonsky states that the circumstances
and procedures used in acquiring data for F.I. cards often involves
racial profiling.' 55 Yablonsky states that minority youths comprise
approximately ninety percent of the people indicated in F.I. cards.'
56
Too often, especially in minority areas.., the benign activity
of hanging-out is perceived as illegal - and innocent youths
are 'profiled' and ID'd as gang members in what is known as
an F.I. (Field Investigation Report). This ID, used by many
police departments, mainly against minority youths, can
appear as a negative mark - if the youth is later arrested in a
gang incident.'
57
An example of the use of F.I. cards can be seen in Rebecca
Allen's article, People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna: Abusing California's
Nuisance Law to Control Gangs.158  Allen examines San Jose,
California police practices in "validating" members of the VLS and
VST gangs. 159 The validation process required an officer to fill out
an F.I. card whenever the officer had an encounter with a citizen,
regardless of whether the encounter resulted in or involved an
arrest. 160 "Thus, an individual may be labeled by the police as a
153. WATKINS & ASHBY, supra note 37, at 54-58.
154. YABLONSKY, supra note 134, at 115.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 106.
158. Rebecca Allen, Note, People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna: Abusing California's Nuisance




VSL/VST member simply by admitting membership, wearing the
gang 'attire' of baggy trousers with blue or black shirts, or being
seen on two or more occasions in the company of another purported
gang member."'
16 1
Allen finds fault with using F.I. cards as a procedure to catalogue
"gang members" because some members of gangs simply join for
protection, recognition, and companionship, not to commit violent
acts. 162 People join gangs for different reasons; therefore, outward
gang symbols or attire should not themselves be indicative of a
criminal purpose.' 6 3 "A flaw in San Jose's identification method is it
does not distinguish between social associations and associations
established for the purpose of engaging in illegal activity. Thus,
individuals may find themselves criminal defendants simply because
their name appeared on the F1 card list."
'1 64
Susan Burrell notes that it is easy to imagine a childhood
nickname being transformed into a "moniker" and a group of friends
into "homeboys."'' 65  "Innocent sounding questions at a field
interview, such as, 'What do they call you?' or 'Where are you
from?' can result in long term sinister complications for young
people growing up in areas of high gang activity."'
' 66
b. Formal Training
Gang expert testimony is often based on formal training
involving assignment to a special unit investigating street gangs or
some sort of gang suppression and enforcement team.1 67 Thus, much
of what an expert bases his or her opinion on may be training he or
she received from other members of law enforcement. Courts should
pay special attention to this sort of testimony because it is generally
based on hearsay. Like all other statements made by out-of-court
declarants, these statements must meet the "threshold requirement of
reliability" as required by Gardeley. 168 Given the discussion above,
161. Id.
162. Id. at 296-97.
163. Id. at 297.
164. Id.
165. Burrell, supra note 133, at 751.
166. Id.
167. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 771-72. See also People v. Zermeno, 986 P.2d 196, 196
(Cal. 1999); People v. Loeun, 947 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Cal. 1997).
168. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 721 (Cal. 1996).
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which casts some suspicion of unreliability on police methods of
tracking gang membership through the use of F.I. cards and
highlights the difficulty of obtaining rigorous scientific sociological
information about gangs, this might not be a simple task. In light of
the fact that the area of gang expertise is not one which qualifies as
scientific enough to require consideration under the Kelly-Frye test,
to suppose that there is a training program which reliably informs
officers of everything they would need to know about gangs is an
unrealistic assumption.
c. Methodologies, as Described by Police Officer Gang
Experts
Erin Yoshino interviewed practitioners in STEP prosecutions.
1 69
His work suggests that actors in STEP prosecutions do not test
individuals against the institutional definitions of "gang member"
using any established methodology. 170  An individual Yoshino
identified as Deputy District Attorney 1 worked with the Los
Angeles County District Attorney's Hardcore Gang Unit in the late
1990s.171 In this role, he relied on the reports of police officers to
identify gang members for prosecution under STEP. 
172
One police officer Yoshino interviewed (identified as Officer 1)
stated the means by which he identified gang members: "if it looks
like a duck, quacks like a duck, and swims like a duck, it must be a
duck."' 173 Officer 1 adopted a "guilt by association" method of
identification.174 While he noted that popular culture has made what
used to be "gang clothing" unreliable alone in indicating gang
membership, the appearance of clothing and association with
"known gang members" was sufficient to identify someone as a gang
member in his view. 175 Officer 1 was presented with a hypothetical
scenario: a male grew up in a gang's territory, dressed in what
Officer 1 identified as popular "gang" style, and had friends who
169. Erin R. Yoshino, California's Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons from Interviews
with Practitioners, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 117 (2008).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 128.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 129.
174. Id. at 130.
175. Id.
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were gang members.176 Officer 1 would not believe this person if he
said he were not a gang member, saying that "if [Officer 1] did not
want to be identified as a police officer, he would not dress like a
police officer and hang out where only police officers hang out."'
' 77
Yoshino interviewed another officer (identified as Officer 2) who
grew up in a gang territory. 178 Due to his exposure to gangs as a
youth, Officer 2 believed he was able to distinguish between
similarly dressed people to determine who is and who is not a gang
member by "looking at their facial expressions, their body posture
and their attitude."' 179 Officer 2 did not believe other officers had
this ability. 80
iv. Police Officer Gang Expert Testing Versus Sociological
Testing
Unlike police officer gang experts, sociologists use both
qualitative and quantitative methods to form and test hypotheses. 18'
Police officer gang experts could, at best, be said to be utilizing a
distortion of the "qualitative interview" sociological method of
inquiry into the question of "gang culture": interrogation. There are
several problems with this methodology in obtaining reliable results.
First, police do not apply the ethical standards of the field of
sociology when conducting "interviews." 182 The "interviews" police
conduct are for the purposes of prosecution and intentionally avoid a
"minimization of the harm" to the interviewee. While it does not
necessarily follow that deviation from ethical methodologies in the
relevant field would yield unreliable results, it does show that police
officers disregard sociology's professional standards when garnering
information about "gangs." Still, it seems incredible to claim that an
adversarial context does not confound an inquiry into the legitimate
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 131.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. For a brief introduction to sociological methodology, see Sociology, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociology#Sociological-research_methods (last visited Nov 18, 2009).
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beliefs of an interviewee. Purposeful misrepresentation is a more
probable result of an interrogation.
In all the literature under study, Jeffrey Wennar gave the only
plausible, if tenuous, justification to support the idea that a police
interrogation would be a reliable method to study gang culture.'
83
He suggests the police officer gang expert obtains reliable
information from gang members during interrogation because of a
cultural concept called "representation": "members of that gang are
proud to belong and to represent their gang."' 84 This provides a very
uncomplicated explanation for why everything said during an
interrogation would be true. The problem is that this justification
relies on the process of inquiry being reliable - police knowledge of
"representation" is a product of the interrogation process. Further,
even if "representation" exists and operates with equal force in every
interrogation, there is a faulty presumption the person can reliably
provide information about their gang.
Klein demonstrates that the police officer gang expert's
unreliability results from the nature of their contacts with suspected
gang members: "The officer usually concentrates on crime patterns
as the quintessential defining attribute of gangs. He may know little
about... statistical probabilities of behavior." 85  Klein gives a
specific example of the inadequacy of police officer gang expert
"sociological" study by providing empirical analysis outside the
scope of a law enforcement officer's "quantitative interview" (i.e.,
interrogation) methodology:
In one case the prosecution went for first degree murder. The
gang officer testified that the defendant would know that the
death was the 'natural and probable consequence' of a gang
assault. I was able to provide the defense with data from that
officer's department that the actual ratio of recorded gang
assaults to gang homicides was approximately fifteen to one,
making death hardly 'natural and probable.' Further, while
all homicides are recorded but many assaults are not, I could
183. Jeffrey Wennar, Gang Prosecution: The Need for Qualifying Law Enforcement
Officers as Expert Witnesses, 42 PROSECUTOR, Apr.-June 2008, at 31.
184. Id.
185. KLEIN, supra note 85, at 520.
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testify that the fifteen to one ratio was in fact a considerable
understatement. 1
86
The officer in this case, though he had access to potential
quantitative sources (the statistics from his own department), did not
utilize those sources in any competent way. Taking the least cynical
viewpoint, the officer "shot from the hip" in forming his opinion.
Taking a more cynical viewpoint, the testifying officer may have
merely adopted an opinion which best assisted the prosecution.
Neither scenario suggests an application of the scientific method
with attention to accurate reporting.
C. Novel Science Under California Law is Subjected to
Kelly/Frye Scrutiny, the Appropriate Standard for Admission of
Novel Sociological Testimony
In People v. Kelly the Supreme Court of California established
Frye v. United States as the test for scientific expert reliability.'87 To
demonstrate reliability, 1) the party offering the evidence must
demonstrate the reliability of the method, and 2) the witness must be
properly qualified to give an opinion on the subject. 188 This second
prong is discussed further in section III (E). Under Kelly/Frye the
proffered opinion must be generally accepted in the relevant
scientific field. 189 In particular, the Kelly court noted that "exercise
of restraint is especially warranted when the identification technique
is offered to identify the perpetrator of a crime. 'When identification
is chiefly founded upon an opinion which is derived from utilization
of an unproven process or technique, the court must be particularly
careful to scrutinize the general acceptance of the technique.""
'9 90
The gang expert does exactly this; for the purposes of meeting the
elements of STEP, a gang expert must "identify" the defendant as
affiliated with a gang, which creates the same danger the Kelly court
addressed.
186. Id. at 520-21.
187. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
188. Id. at 1244.
189. Id.; Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
190. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1245.
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The case survey revealed only two cases, both unpublished, that
directly address the issue of admission of the police officer gang
expert under the Kelly/Frye standard. The first is People v.
Gallardo,9' in which the court merely states that a Kelly/Frye
objection was brought at trial and that "[t]he court denied the motion,
giving a detailed and thorough ruling."' 92 In the other case, People
v. Benjamin,193 the defense argued unsuccessfully that the defeated
STEP charge allowed the admission of gang expert testimony that
was prejudicial. 94 Leading up to this discussion, the court gave a
brief description of how the trial court disposed of defense's
Kelly/Frye challenge to the proposed testimony: "The court
explained it had no problem with the expert 'giving some evidence
regarding disrespect and what that means in the gang community,'
and the expert could also testify about the use of guns within that
community." 195 That the court "didn't have a problem" with the
gang expert's testimony does not answer the objection to the
admission of the evidence on the basis that the methodology is not
accepted in the relevant scientific community.
Under the Kelly/Frye standard, courts should require the
government to bring evidence that interrogation as a method of
interviewing is generally accepted as reliable in the field of
sociology. However, the California Supreme Court held that gang
expert testimony is admitted under the "opinion rule."' 96 Under the
opinion rule, there is no inquiry into the general acceptance of this
highly suspect methodology as a legitimate basis for forming expert
opinions. The opinion rule's logic is based on the misguided belief
that credentials (in this case law enforcement credentials) are an
adequate substitution for a look into the reliability of an expert's
methodology. The Supreme Court of California gives an excellent
synopsis of the justifications for the opinion rule in People v.
McDonald:
It is important to distinguish... between expert testimony
and scientific evidence. When a witness gives his personal
191. People v. Gallardo, No. G030057, 2003 WL 21983811 (Cal. App. Ct. Aug. 21, 2003).
192. Id. at *4.
193. People v. Benjamin, No. G033106, 2005 WL 1208991 (Cal. App. Ct. May 23, 2005).
194. Id. at *7-9.
195. Id. at *7.
196. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 721 (Cal. 1996).
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opinion on the stand - even if he qualifies as an expert -
the jurors may temper their acceptance of his testimony with
a healthy skepticism born of their knowledge that all human
beings are fallible. But the opposite may be true when the
evidence is produced by a machine: Like many laypersons,
jurors tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of certainty
to proof derived from an apparently "scientific" mechanism,
instrument, or procedure. Yet the aura of infallibility that
often surrounds such evidence may well conceal the fact that
it remains experimental and tentative. [citation omitted] For
this reason, courts have invoked the Kelly-Frye rule primarily
in cases involving novel devices or processes such as lie
detectors, "truth serum," Nalline testing, experimental
systems of blood typing, "voiceprints," identification by
human bite marks, microscopic analysis of gunshot residue,
and hypnosis [citations omitted] and, most recently, proof of
guilt by "rape trauma syndrome.'
1 97
Basically, the justification for more stringent gatekeeping in the
realm of "scientific instruments" is that when instruments produce
the data underlying an expert opinion it might supplant the fact-
finding function of the jury because of an "aura of infallibility."
' 198
This impulse means the courts must apply Kelly/Frye to ensure that
data's reliability. 199 The Court's position is that the jury does not
have the same impulse when instruments do not produce the data
supporting the opinion. Instead, the court believes juries are able to
accept or reject the testimony of an expert with a credibility
200analysis.
Prosecutors themselves seem to disagree with the premise on
which this distinction relies with regard to police officer gang
experts. They understand that if an expert possesses qualifications
that impress the jury, the jury will accept the expert's version of the
facts. Jackson illustrates this point nicely:
197. People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24 (Cal. 1984).
198. See id. David L. Faigman, Admissibility Regimes: The "Opinion Rule" and Other
Oddities and Exceptions to Scientific Evidence, the Scientific Revolution, and Common Sense, 36
Sw. U. L. REv. 699, 706-07 (2008).
199. McDonald, 690 P.2d at 723-24.
200. Id.
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Keep in mind that the jury will be asked to believe the
opinion of the expert, a person they have never heard of and
have never met. Most of their impression will be based on
the expert's qualifications, as drawn out by the prosecutor.
Those qualifications will be the foundation upon which the
rest of the expert's testimony will be based. If they are
slight, vague or otherwise unimpressive, the jury will
disregard the expert's opinion. If ... the qualifications are
notable and well articulated, the jury will follow the expert's
lead.2"'
It is a "credential" analysis that the jury engages in, not a
"credibility" analysis. If the jury finds the credentials of the expert
sufficient, the jury will uncritically adopt the expert's opinion.20 2
Jackson describes the power of a gang expert, as well as the vast
number of elements in the underlying charge that the expert could
support. At the conclusion of Jackson's argument he reminds his
reader of the breadth of the expert's "expertise" before reiterating the
ability of the expert to supplant the judgment of the jury:
From the witness stand, the expert can establish the
defendant's gang affiliation in several ways, including the
defendant's admission of membership to the expert, the
defendant's tattoos, and his consistent association with other
gang members. The expert can also relate the defendant's
gang's rivalries in the community, as well as the gang's
history and structure ... as well as the interpretation of
graffiti, gang slang and gang monikers. The expert may also
explain the gang's criminal tactics, culture, and habits.
Remember, the expert is giving opinions. There are no
"wrong" answers.2 0
The gang expert's testimony in People v. Garcia illustrates the
point that gang expert opinion can subvert the fact-finding function
of the jury. In Garcia, the gang expert demonstrated his
201. Jackson, supra note 58, at 39.
202. Id. at 36.
203. Id.
204. People v. Garcia, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104 (App. Ct. 2007).
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knowledge of the legal definition of "street gang" to the jury by
defining a street gang in his experience using the precise language of
the statute, prior to giving his opinion on the ultimate issue:
"[Orange County Sheriffs Investigator] Zurborg testified as an
expert on gangs. He testified a gang is a group of three or more
individuals with a common name, sign, or symbol, which engages in
a pattern of criminal activity. 2 °5  STEP defines "criminal street
gang" as "any ongoing organization.., of three or more persons...
having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and
whose members individually or collectively engage in ... a pattern
of criminal gang activity."
20 6
Professor David Faigman points out some of the problems with
the opinion rule in the context of psychological testimony on the
subject of "dangerousness": "The California approach effectively
gives a free pass to experience based clinical judgment and erects
substantial barriers to the introduction of science-based actuarial
techniques. '' 207 Faigman argues that it defies reason to allow non-
scientific opinion an easy admission while erecting barriers for
opinion based on science.20 8 He cites the Arizona Supreme Court's
opinion in Logerquist v. McVey as the best articulation of the
premises underlying the opinion rule: "Frye is applicable when an
expert witness reaches a conclusion by deduction from the
application of novel scientific principles, formulae, or procedures
developed by others." 20 9 The court continued: "Frye is inapplicable
when a witness reaches a conclusion by inductive reasoning based on
his or her own experience, observation, or research.,
210
Faigman points out that inductive and deductive reasoning do not
exist separately, but rather, one serves the other: "inductive
reasoning" is "hypothesis formation through anecdotal
experience., 2 1 1 The opinion rule subjects tested hypotheses to strict
standards of admission under Kelly/Frye, whereas untested
hypotheses come into evidence if the expert has qualifications the
court deems sufficient.
205. Id. at 107-08.
206. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2009).
207. Faigman, supra note 198, at 708.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 709.
210. Id.; Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 133 (Ariz. 2000).
211. Faigman, supra note 198, at 711.
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FaiMan identifies the two premises on which the opinion rule is
based. 2 The first is that jurors are skeptical of non-scientific
experts, but they are not skeptical of scientific experts because of
their qualifications.2 13 The second is that jurors are able to critically
analyze the bases of non-scientific opinion, whereas they would have
trouble analyzing the bases of scientific opinion.214 With regard to
the latter, Faigman points out that cross-examination is unlikely to be
effective with well-credentialed experts because that expert is likely
to fully believe in the validity of their methods. 215 The reliability of
an expert's method cannot be tested by the expert's credibility or
credentials. The most eminently qualified individual can proffer an
opinion he or she truly believes, which is based on unreliable
methods.
The unfortunate reality in California is that expert opinions based
on data gathered without the use of instruments are not subjected to
216Kelly/Frye. However, there is some precedent for subjecting
"inductive" opinions to Kelly/Frye. In People v. Bledsoe the
California Supreme Court found the admission of expert testimony
on Rape Trauma Syndrome [hereinafter "RTS"] abused the trial
court's discretion on Kelly/Frye reliability grounds.2 17 The Court
held that the syndrome was not devised as a means of uncovering the
truth of whether or not rape had in fact occurred, but to "help
identify, predict and treat emotional problems experienced by the
counselor's patients., 218 The counselors applying the RTS theory
are taught to avoid judging the credibility of their client, and not to
probe inconsistencies in their clients' stories.219 The holding was
fairly limited - the Court held that RTS was not relied upon in the
relevant scientific community for the purposes of determining
whether a rape actually occurred, but did not reach whether RTS was
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community for the
212. Id. at 713.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 714.
216. See infra, Section III.D.
217. People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984).
218. Id. at 300-01.
219. Id. at 301.
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purposes of treatment. 220 It is not clear whether the court would
have applied Kelly/Frye or the opinion rule. Because of this
irrational state of law, as a practical matter criminal defense
attorneys may be better served by attacking the sociological
credentials of the police officer gang expert (versus the general
acceptance of the officer's methodologies) in efforts to exclude that
testimony.
D. Even Under the Permissive Opinion Rule, Police Officers
Lack the Qualifications to Give Opinions as Sociologists
The opinion rule in the clinical expertise context substitutes a
look at the credentials of the expert for an inquiry into the reliability
of the opinion. The Supreme Court of California implied this
general rule in People v. Stoll: "[w]e conclude that a qualified
psychologist's diagnosis does not offend [admission] standards
solely because it is grounded upon interviews and standardized
tests."' 221 The Court continued: "[w]e adhere to settled law viewing
this testimony as competent but disputable 'expert opinion,' rather
than new 'scientific' evidence that must be proven reliable before it's
admitted."
222
In order to be of assistance to the jury in a matter "beyond the
ken" of the normal juror, the testifying expert must have some
qualification in the area of "gang membership" and the vagaries of
"gang membership" in the gang at bar. As Placido Gomez points
out, "although the gang experts are generally experienced and
trained, '[r]epeated observations of an event without inquiry,
analysis, or experiment does not turn the mere observer into an
expert."'
223
Though in the context of a reliability inquiry, the Kelly court
discussed the proper qualifications of an expert opining on scientific
processes under Evidence Code Section 720, subd. (a).22 4 The expert
220. Id. Burrell argues that the Bledsoe principle might be an effective precedent for
excluding gang expertise, giving a number of cases in which psychological testimony has been
excluded. Burrell, supra note 133, at 773 n. 10.
221. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 699 (Cal. 1989) (emphasis added). See also Wilson v.
Phillips, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 207 (Ct. App. 1999); People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 831
(Ct. App. 1999).
222. Stoll, 783 P.2d at 699.
223. Gomez, supra note 84, at 622 (citing Burrell, supra note 133, at 770 n. 10).
224. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248-50 (Cal. 1976).
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in this case was a police officer testifying on voiceprint analysis.
225
His qualifications included employment as the head of a police
department's voice identification unit and classes in audiology,
speech sciences, anatomy, and the physiology of speech, which
included fifty hours of coursework but no formal degree.226 The
court noted that most experts who worked in the field had
227qualifications similar to the expert in question.  In analyzing the
question of the reliability of the expert testimony, the court noted
three infirmities. 228 First, one expert was insufficient to resolve the
"general acceptance" issue. 229 Second, the testifying expert's
livelihood depended on the court's acceptance of the reliability of his
testimony as the sole consumer of this "science." 230  The court
doubted that the expert could fairly represent the state of the field.231
Finally, and of particular relevance to the question presented in this
section, the court questioned the qualifications of the expert to testify
on the science:
The record . . . reveals that Nash has an impressive list of
credentials in the field of voiceprint analysis. However, these
qualifications are those of a technician and law enforcement
officer, not a scientist. Neither his training . . . his limited
college study in certain speech sciences, his membership in
organizations promoting the use of voiceprints, nor his
former position as head of the Michigan State Police Voice
Identification Unit, necessarily qualifies Nash to express an
informed opinion on the view of the scientific community
toward voiceprint analysis. This area may be one in which
only another scientist, in regular communication with other
colleagues in the field, is competent to express such an
opinion.
232
225. Id. at 1248.
226, Id.
227. Id. at 1248-49.
228, Id.
229. Id.
230, Id. at 1249.
231, Id.
232. Id. at 1250.
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Similarly, a police officer will rarely possess the credentials
necessary to give an opinion on a sociological phenomenon.
E. Defying the Basic Principles of the Criminal Justice System
Which Place the Burden of Proof onto the Government, Courts
Systematically Accommodate the Prosecution's Need For
Evidence
In the area of gang expertise, it seems trial courts are attempting
to negotiate two irreconcilable positions. Trial courts may not even
be aware of this tension, but many of the opinions show a mild
discomfort in their justifications for upholding police officer gang
233expert admissibility decisions. On one hand, courts seem aware
that police officers are not qualified to give evidence as
sociologists. 234  Simultaneously, courts are aware that gang experts
testify in the field of sociology.235 On the other hand, courts find the
expertise necessary.236 Invariably, courts are falling on the "need for
evidence" side, and attempting to justify admission by changing the
issue from reliability to relevancy. This result is not compelled by
any principle in law. There is no reason why prosecutorial evidence
should have a lighter burden - indeed the rhetoric of our criminal
justice system would suggest that procedural protections for criminal
defendants demand a higher standard for evidentiary admission, not
a lower one.
Many authors have suggested that courts routinely rubber-stamp
prosecutorial evidence that is of questionable reliability.237 Michael
Risinger's survey of federal cases in the wake of Daubert suggests
233. Nowhere is this discomfort more apparent than in McDaniels: "Deputy Giron stated
,as part of [his] duties [he had] made an effort to study the social customs .. of gangs in south
central Los Angeles.' We are unable to discern why defendant insists that the foregoing so
utterly fails to reflect sufficient familiarity with south central Los Angeles gangs." People v.
McDaniels, 166 Cal. Rptr. 12, 16 (Ct. App. 1980).
234. See id.
235. See, e.g., People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 721 (Cal. 1996).
236. Our argument is that the police officer gang expert reliability inquiry is transformed
into a relevance inquiry for the purposes of accommodating a prosecutorial need for evidence.
See discussion supra Part III.
237. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 198, at 716-22; Jolle Anne Moreno, What Happens
when Dirty Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 8
["[t]he complex problems endemic to law enforcement expert testimony have been ignored for
too long by judges easily satisfied with a cursory review of expert qualifications and perfunctory
acceptance of a panoply of a police opinions and conclusions."]; Gomez, supra note 84, at 622
(describing the low standards of admission of police officer gang expert testimony in Texas).
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that this assertion is true.238 Risinger looked at cases citing Daubert
from July 1, 1993, to August 2, 1999.239 Using this reference set, he
found that in appeals from a criminal conviction, defendants
complaining of unreliable government proffers lost ninety percent of
the time (61/67).240 This statistic might give the reader the
impression that appellate courts are more critical of government
proffered expertise than they actually are, even though defendants
lost at an extraordinary rate. Of defense victories, there was only
one case where the reviewing court found the witness "generally
undependable, or undependable in regard to the particular
application of expertise for which the government witness was
called., 241 In the remaining five cases, the error in one was to have
not conducted a Daubert hearing at all; in three the error was the
expert exceeding the scope of his expertise; and in one there was a
"failure of a factual condition to the dependable application of the
expertise. 242
Defendants in the appellate sample also complained of Daubert
rulings that kicked out evidence proffered by the defendant fifty-four
times.243 Defendants won on ten of these occasions. 244 However, in
seven of these cases the error was the failure to hold a Daubert
hearing (this might only result in reversal if the Daubert hearing
showed the evidence to be undependable, and that error was
245harmless). In two of the cases the appellate court found the
exclusion of expertise to be harmless.246 The defendant won a
247reversal and remand in only one case. As Risinger points out,
deference doctrines (i.e., harmless error, abuse of discretion) make
reversal on appeal very difficult.
248
Risinger also surveyed district court rulings. 249  Though one
might attribute the appellate court results to the above-noted
238. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty
Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REv. 99 (2000).
239. Id. at 104.
240. Id. at 151.
241. Id. at 105.
242. Id. at 105-06.
243. Id. at 106.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 107.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 108-09.
249. Id. at 109.
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doctrines of deference, Risinger's district court survey results
conformed to the same trends at the appellate level.250 Government
challenges to defense evidence succeeded in two-thirds of the cases
under survey. 251 On the other side, defense objected to government
evidence twelve times in the survey.252 The government prevailed in
eleven of those cases, and in the remaining case, the government was
allowed to present the evidence with restrictions.253
While the numbers are suggestive of bias, they do not account for
the possibility that defendants might generally put on unreliable
evidence and the government does not. Risinger did not limit his
study to the aggregate numbers, but showed an astonishing pro-
prosecution bias in "educational" expertise - exactly the kind of
expertise offered by police officer gang experts.2 54  Risinger
compared the exclusion rates of defense eyewitness identification
experts (who would testify to the weakness of eyewitness
identification) to government modus operandi/argot experts (who
testify to criminal scheme operation and criminal slang).255  The
selection of these two types of expertise has a built-in control
favoring defense admission under Daubert's factors of reliability:
eyewitness expertise is presented by psychologists with empirical
studies to support their opinions, whereas motive operandi/argot
evidence is presented by police officers who give anecdotal evidence
25and testify from their experience. 256 In addition, it is easier to restrict
the defense witnesses to "educational" testimony to prevent jury
confusion; eyewitness identification experts are not involved in the
case, whereas the police officer will often also give fact testimony
about the case at hand.257 Despite what one might expect under
Daubert, defense experts supported by empirical evidence were
rejected two-thirds of the time (21/31 cases) and prosecution experts
testifying to anecdotal experience were allowed ninety percent of the
time (20/22 cases).258
250. Id. at 110, 151.
251. Id. at 110.
252. Id. at 109.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 131-32.
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We go farther in our interpretation of the data than Risinger. We
suggest that in the absence of a strong tradition of scientific inquiry
into areas of expertise that would benefit prosecutorial theories - or
in areas like gang expertise where the findings of a strong tradition
of scientific inquiry contradict proffered prosecutorial expertise -
courts accommodate a prosecutor's "need for evidence" by granting
it easy admission.
"Need for evidence" does not transform a police officer into a
sociologist. Even if that were a valid rationale for lowering the
threshold of admissibility, the "need for evidence" argument itself
falls flat. There are insider experts in the field of gang culture who
do not require academic credentials to testify: members of the gang
at issue. That these witnesses are hard to come by is not a sufficient
justification for removing the "qualification" prong of admissibility
under the opinion rule so that readily-accessible police/experts may
testify. It stands to reason that the expert, at a very minimum, have
some sort of experience in the field about which he or she testifies to
satisfy any admissibility regime.
IV. Solutions
A. Mitigating Strategies Defense Attorneys Can Use to Combat
the Troubling Effects of Police Expert Testimony
Given the fact that effecting a change in the California Evidence
Code might take some time, the task of mitigating the problematic
effects of expert reliance on stealth testimonial hearsay falls on the
shoulders of defense attorneys in gang prosecutions. There are
different approaches defense attorneys can take to do this, such as
filing extensive discovery motions and requesting in camera review
of evidence.
i. Discovery Motions and Motions In Limine
One strategy defense attorneys can employ is filing discovery
motions and motions in limine. Motions in limine can be used to
limit the expert's testimony. As the Supreme Court noted in Davis v.
Washington, "through in limine procedure, [trial courts] should
redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have become
[Vol. 7
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testimonial, as they do, for example, with unduly prejudicial portions
of otherwise admissible evidence. ' 259 Discovery motions should
also be filed in order to discover the bases for an expert's opinion.
Not only does this reveal information about the type of evidence the
expert is relying on, it also gives defense attorneys a chance to
evaluate the reliability of that evidence for themselves. As Susan
Burrell states, "[t]hrough formal discovery, counsel may learn what
the police think they know about a defendant, and the source of the
information." 260 Discovery motions can also include requests for the
police guidelines and standards for inputting and removing gang
information in the police filing system as well as information about
how a gang expert was trained.261
ii. Requests for In Camera Review
Defense attorneys can also request that evidence be reviewed in
camera away from the jury. This might be useful in situations like
the one addressed above, where an expert's testimony that a gang
exists is based on a prior conviction of another person in relation to
the same gang. During an in camera review, the defense attorney
would have the opportunity to argue, for example, that the prior
conviction was the result of a plea bargain, and therefore insufficient
to reliably establish the existence of the gang. Requests for in
camera review could also be used in other situations in order to
attempt to challenge the admission of police officer gang expert
testimony, without allowing the jury to hear this potentially
extremely prejudicial evidence.
B. Increase the Showing Required For Reliability of Expert
Testimony To Something Closer to the Daubert Standard
California should also take a more restrictive attitude toward
police expert testimony. As discussed above, having judges play
more of a role does not necessarily solve the problem of stealth
testimonial hearsay, as discussed above. However, as California has
not adopted the Daubert standard, experts are currently playing the
259. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
260. Burrell, supra, NOTE 133 at 751.
261. Id.
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role of the fact finder by deciding whether the evidence they are
basing their opinion on is reliable and accurate in many situations.
We would advocate a more active judicial gatekeeping role, not as a
cure-all for the problems involved in the use of testimonial hearsay,
but as a temporary bandage until the problem can be addressed.
Requiring gang experts to base their testimony on more "scientific"
data might be another solution - one which would be in keeping
with the requirements of expert testimony in other types of cases
under the Kelly-Frye test. This would help reduce the common
practice of gang experts making sweeping statements about gangs
based on "personal observations" and "experience." As Susan
Burrell points out: "Should the prosecutor offer the testimony of a
gang expert to show that a particular form of gang behavior was
predictable or subject to set rules, he is essentially acting as a
behavioral scientist. Thus, the more stringent Kelly-Frye test of
admissibility should be applied in such cases. 262
C. Follow the Lead of the Ninth Circuit in Briceno v. Scribner
and Require That an Expert's Testimony Be Supported by
Direct or Circumstantial Evidence
One last suggestion which would help to mitigate the effects of
police gang expert testimony involves the court playing more of a
role in enforcing the reliability requirement in terms of the
foundation of an expert's opinion. The Ninth Circuit's recent
decision in Briceno v. Scribner is an excellent example of this
263approach. In Briceno, the Ninth Circuit held that a gang expert's
testimony regarding Briceno's specific intent in terms of the STEP
enhancement needed to be supplemented with direct or
circumstantial evidence in order to have been sufficient for
admissibility.264  Rather than letting an expert's sweeping
generalities go by unchallenged, the Ninth Circuit raised the bar,
indicating that experts would have to base their opinions on actual
evidence relevant to the case at hand rather than broad
generalizations. California courts should follow the lead of the
Ninth Circuit and require more evidence from gang experts.
262. Id. at 772.




After examining the language and legislative intent of the
California STEP Act, discussing the evidentiary power of police
gang experts, and looking at the problems associated with qualifying
police officers as gang experts and allowing them to testify as such
in court, it seems clear that Kelly/Frye is the appropriate standard for
admission of novel sociological testimony such as gang expert
testimony. Realistically, however, it is not likely that the standard
for admissibility is likely to change. Even so, the use of police
officers as gang experts should be impermissible under the current
standard of admission in California, the "opinion rule." Given the
fact that minority populations are the primary target of this improper
use of police officers as gang experts, it is imperative that action is
taken to try to bar the admissibility, or mitigate the effects, of police
gang expert testimony. We hope that some of the solutions and
suggestions offered above will be helpful in this regard.
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